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TheUnited States andRussia are dismantling nuclear weapons andgenerating hundreds oftons ofexeess plutonium andhigh enriched uranium fissde nuclear materials that wuire disposition. TheU.S. Department ofEnergy andRusskm Minatomorganizations are planning andimplementing safe, seeure storage and disposition operations for these materials innumerous facilities. This provides a new opportunity for technical exchanges between Russian and Western scientists that can establish an improved and sustained common safety culture for handling these materials. An initiative that develops and uses personal relationships and joint projects .
among Russian and Western participants involved in fissile nuclear materials safety management contributes to improving nuclear materials nonproliferation and to making a safer world. Technical exchanges and workshops are being used to systematically identify opportunities in the nuclear f~sile materials facilities to improve and ensure the safety of workers, the public, and the environment.
With the ending of the Cold War and the implementation of various nuclear arms reduction agreements, the United States and Russia have been actively dismantling tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. As a resul~large quantities of fissile materials, including more than 100 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and significantly more high-enriched uranium (HEU), have become excess to both countries' military needs. To meet nonproliferation goals and to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, these excess fissile materials must be placed and maintained in seeure storage prior to being dispositioned. Storage of excess fissile materials is a prerequisite to any disposition process, but the length of storage time is unknown. Disposition of large quantities of plutonium and HEU will require decades, Thus, safe, secure storage for excess fissile materials is mandated for decades-and The U.S.-Russian Intergovemmental Nuclear Materials Safety Management Program is limited to those issues related to the storage and disposition of excess fissile materials. It does not deal with nuclear reactor issues, except for fuel fabrication and spent-fuel storage, and is not involved in strategic activities associated with nuclear weapons stockpiles, except for disposition of the nuclear materials resulting from weapons dismantling and excess "in-process" materials.
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The low-level wastes and uranium mining and milling operations are also not explicitly considered. The following figure shows the boundary of the nuclear materials safety program and its included and excluded activities. The results of this program include an increased understanding of nuclear materials safety approaches, improved safety practices in nuclear facilities, inculcation of a nuclear materials safety culture, and realization of national and international goals incorporating safety into all aspects of nuclear materials safety management and disposition. At this juncture, a key contribution of the activities of this program is to assist in sustaining a viable human resource in the field of nuclear safety during a period of budgeting constraint in the United States and economic uncertainty in Russia.
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